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introduction:
War measures and the repression of
radicalism
B A R R Y W R I G H T, E R I C T U C K E R ,
and S U S A N B I N N I E

this fourth volume in the Canadian State Trials series, Security, Dissent,
and the Limits of Toleration in War and Peace, 1914–1939, brings readers to
the period of the First World War and the inter-war years. it follows an
approach similar to that of others in the series. the central concern remains the legal responses of Canadian governments to real and perceived
threats to the security of the state. the aim is to provide a representative
and relatively comprehensive examination of Canadian experiences with
these matters, placed in broader historical and comparative context.
the previous volumes (Volume i, 1608–1837; Volume ii, 1837–1839;
Volume iii, 1840–1914) examined trials for the classic political offences
of treason and sedition, and looked at related security measures such as
suspensions of habeas corpus, deportations, resorts to martial law, and
the trials of civilians by military courts. this volume examines similar responses to security concerns in a fundamentally changed context, that of
the early twentieth century, a period of major and intense upheavals. the
First World War saw the assumption of new powers by the Canadian state
and prompted new political issues and diffcult questions about Canadian
identity and legal status at local, national, and international levels. the
ensuing inter-war years brought serious economic challenges and unprecedented tensions between labour and capital. Governments struggled to
address these challenges, and they responded to emergency, crisis, and
perceived security issues by relying on a mixture of traditional and new
legal measures.
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We begin with a brief sketch of the main political events and related
economic and social issues during the 1914–39 period, followed by a brief
note about common legal themes shared with previous volumes in the
series. a more detailed survey of the main legal responses, and general
issues that arise in this volume, sets the stage for the ensuing chapters.
these are briefy summarized at the end of this introduction.
setting the historical stage and overarching themes
Canada in 1914 was a self-governing dominion but with limited autonomy. london controlled foreign policy for the British empire and Canada was committed to war in august 1914. the dominion’s plans for a
considerable contribution to the British war effort were initially widely
supported in english Canada. thirty thousand men enlisted voluntarily,
going overseas in october 1914 to fght on the Western Front by early 1915,
followed by 400,000 more over the course of the war. at home, the government enacted the sweeping War measures act, 1914 (Wma) to manage
the domestic war effort. Canadian factories began to produce munitions
on an enormous scale, Canadian farmers were enlisted to feed the allied
troops, and an income tax was introduced to support the unprecedented
state commitments and interventions.
more than sixty thousand Canadians would be killed by 1918. as the
war took a brutal toll, consensus slowly diminished. the Canadian victory
at Vimy in april 1917, which left over ten thousand dead and wounded,
was a turning point. in may 1917, as public opinion became increasingly
divided and the number of reinforcements dwindled, Conservative Prime
minister robert Borden sought to demonstrate Canada’s continuing resolve by announcing his government’s intention to introduce conscription. He presented the policy as a necessary step to support the volunteer
soldiers overseas, whose huge sacrifces and contributions must not be
in vain. Politically, the government believed that Canada’s unwavering
support would help secure British promises of increased autonomy in the
future.
liberal leader Wilfrid laurier, always looking to the middle ground
between english Canadian imperialists and French Canadian nationalists,
called for robust war production and volunteerism rather than conscription. laurier refused to participate in a formal wartime domestic political
alliance and Borden turned to english Canadian liberal mPs, drawing
many into a new unionist party formed to contest the december 1917
election.1
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in September 1917 the government passed the Wartime elections act,
amending dominion elections legislation to extend the franchise to mothers, sisters, wives, and widows of servicemen but removing it from immigrants from enemy nations.2 about ffty thousand Canadian residents lost
the right to vote, compounding the discrimination already experienced
by many immigrants. as a result of earlier executive orders issued under
the Wma, over eighty thousand residents had been required to register
as enemy aliens, carry identity papers, and report regularly to the police.
as the war continued, more than eighty-fve hundred were denied habeas
corpus and interned without trial as enemy aliens; about a third were prisoners of war but the majority were civilian Canadian residents of ukrainian background.3
the bitter 1917 election campaign resulted in a decisive unionist majority in december but with only three government seats from the province
of Quebec. the election deepened divisions between english and French
Canada and conscription riots that followed in Quebec in the spring were
met by resort to military aid to the civil power, leading to the deaths of
four protesters. the fnal year of the war saw harsher censorship, the banning of political groups, and continued attempts to bring sedition prosecutions against those who criticized government and the war effort.
the 1914–18 war effort had a signifcant impact on the Canadian economy, which, despite a recovery from the long depression of the late nineteenth century, had experienced a recession in the years immediately
prior to the outbreak of war.4 as production ramped up and men left for
the front, the economy began to accelerate and labour shortages combined
with wartime infation created conditions conducive to labour militancy,
setting off the largest wave of strikes to that point in Canada’s history.5
the government scrambled to contain this threat to the war effort, initially
emphasizing measures that promoted cooperation between employers
and “responsible” unions. as the war continued, however, ottawa increasingly turned to the use of coercion, ultimately prohibiting strikes in
war-related industries.6
divisive conficts and repressive state interventions continued after the
peace of 11 november 1918. there were delays in demobilization and former soldiers, once home in Canada, faced unemployment. many workers demanded that the sacrifces they had made in a war “fought to save
democracy against the scourges of Kaiserism” should result in changes
to their workplaces and, in particular, that employers should recognize
and bargain with trade unions.7 For the most part, employers preferred a
return to the pre-war status quo, and, while some in government wanted

This content downloaded from 130.63.63.214 on Fri, 25 Nov 2022 01:01:04 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Wright-Tucker-Binnie_4944_001_(Wright-Tucker-Binnie).indd 5

19/09/2015 7:54:45 AM

6

b a r r y w r i g h t, e r i c t u c ker, and susan binnie

to continue the wartime policy of promoting collective bargaining, in
general there was little support for such measures. indeed, the principal
government response to rising labour radicalism in the post-war era was
to enshrine in legislation some of the repressive measures put in place
towards the end of the war under the Wma and strengthen the state’s
permanent coercive powers.
Some of the new powers were soon put to use in post-war confrontations between labour and capital, notably during the Winnipeg General
Strike of 1919, when the state responded by calling out the militia, arresting and prosecuting the strike leaders, and deporting aliens.8 the combined effects of repression and the return of economic prosperity in much
of Canada during the early 1920s saw a reduction in trade-union activity.
But in some regions, such as the maritimes, labour militancy continued.
Cape Breton coal miners and steel workers fought back against the beginning of the long decline of these industries, and the state responded in
much the same way as it had a few years earlier in Winnipeg.9
events outside Canada, most signifcantly the Bolshevik revolution in
october 1917, also fuelled fears of domestic radicalism. the government
responded to the revolution by sending troops, including conscripts, to
join an undeclared and unsuccessful war on the new Soviet government
waged by thirteen allied countries.10 at the same time, Canada also reorganized and strengthened its domestic security forces. the pace and urgency of security operations eased after the immediate post-war turmoil
but intensifed again with the onset of the Great depression in 1929. Political and labour radicalism grew stronger as the Communist Party of Canada attracted new members and established a separate union movement,
the Workers’ unity league (Wul), which successfully organized workers
in many parts of Canada.11 While these organizations often demanded
reforms, their long-term goal was to bring about the end of capitalism,
which the Communist international (Ci) during its third Period (1928–35)
believed to be in its fnal phase. the Ci encouraged its member parties to
adopt a militant line. in response, the Canadian government acted quickly
to suppress this perceived threat to the established order, exercising the
extraordinary powers that had been made permanent at war’s end. leaders of the Communist Party in Canada who were British subjects were
prosecuted while large numbers of foreign-born radicals were deported.12
the intensity of repressive actions diminished after 1935, in part as a result of the election of a liberal government under mackenzie King – more
inclined to rule by compromise and accommodation than with an iron
fst. in addition, the Ci’s adoption of the Popular Front policy in response
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to the rise of fascism in europe resulted in the Canadian party adopting
different tactics. it dismantled the Wul and directed its member unions
to seek integration into the mainstream trades and labour Congress.
Party members started working in broad alliances with other progressive
groups.13
the previous volumes in the series examined how the circumstances
of war, invasion, and insurrection prompted prosecutions for political offences. Popular movements of opposition, dissent, and resistance were
also sometimes apprehended as insurrectionary, or as potential threats
to the existing order, and were met by such prosecutions as well. a shift
in legal responses, noted in Volume iii, became increasingly evident in
the 1914–39 period. Prosecutions for treason and sedition, the traditional
response and primary subject of state trials, were increasingly supplanted
by reliance on legislation that authorized the administration of nationalsecurity measures. Such measures provided governments with more fexibility than prosecutions for the traditional political offences. they enabled
a wider, more intensive regulation of security threats, supported by new
institutions of surveillance and enforcement. the summary administrative processes introduced were diffcult to challenge in the courts, supported by a judicial tendency to defer to legislated, delegated executive
authority and discretion, and by the modifcation or even suspension of
procedural protections usually found in regular criminal trials.
there are nonetheless more similarities than differences between traditional and modern legal responses to security threats. these laws were
and remain contentious because of their obvious political overtones, impact on civil society, and the manner in which they compromise rights
and abrogate civil liberties. they are in confict or tension with formal
constitutional and legal claims and popular expectations of these claims.
it is also the case that popular deference to government justifcations for
special powers, whether cast as matters of public safety or citing other
urgent reasons, diminishes when there is obvious abuse of these laws.
Yet, despite these common characteristics, the older and newer security
responses also defy easy assessment and generalization.
the complexity of these laws and their administration was demonstrated in previous volumes in the series. legal responses to real or perceived security threats by way of resort to regular processes of justice
tended to enhance the legitimacy of government actions and broaden
public support to a much greater degree than military responses or
other heavy-handed forms of repression. But using ordinary law also entailed risks for governments. the accused contested their prosecutions in
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public tribunals. Governments had to attend to popular expectations
about justice and the integrity of their formal legal and constitutional
claims. effective defences were possible. Prosecutions could be frustrated
and acquittals could discredit governments and enhance public support
for the accused and his or her cause.
Governments were acutely aware of all of this. nevertheless, during the
most serious security crises there tended to be wider resort to exceptional
measures authorized by temporary emergency legislation or exercise of
prerogative powers.14 as seen in previous volumes, these included procedural expedients that favoured the crown’s case in trials and suspensions
of habeas corpus that supported indefnite detentions and summary deportations (e.g., War of 1812, upper Canada for most of 1838, the Fenian
crisis of the late 1860s, and the 1885 north-West rebellion). in extreme
situations, governments would claim that the regular administration of
justice must be suspended altogether; martial law was imposed and civilians were subjected to military justice (as in Quebec in the late eighteenth
century, lower Canada in 1837–8, and parts of upper Canada in late
1838).
along with the shift away from the prosecution of political offences
there was also a modifcation of exceptional security responses by the
early twentieth century. military aid to the civil power was regularized
and exceptions to the usual processes of criminal justice came to be deployed under the authority of modern security legislation that was permanent rather than temporary. these developments tended to result in
exceptions that continued in effect well beyond the crisis or concern that
prompted them in the frst place, typically justifed as necessary to contend with changed twentieth-century realities, whether those changes
concerned the nature of threats posed by hostile powers, support for effective and comprehensive public responses to emergencies, or the protection of important state secrets in a technological information age. in
short, states of exception have tended to become normalized. Yet it remained the case that the resort to more arbitrary measures and the extent
of their use depended not only on the gravity of the security threat but
also on what eric tucker has aptly described as the “social zone of toleration.”15 emergency expedients that suspended regular legal and constitutional protections required not only political and legal justifcation
but also popular legitimacy in order to be effective. the First World War
and the security concerns relating to the labour movement and to aliens
that continued in its wake provide ample demonstration of these general
themes.
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canada’s national-security laws in the early
twentieth century
as noted in the previous volume of Canadian State Trials, the 1892 Criminal Code retained the classic political offences of treason and sedition. the
three main forms of high treason, dating to the time of edward iii, were
replicated in modern language, accompanied by a lesser new form of
treason and the unique Canadian political offence of lawless aggression.16
no treason prosecutions on the scale of the riel trial and the other trials
from the 1885 north-West rebellion would be ventured again by Canadian governments, although slight amendments were eventually made to
the Code in the early 1950s.17 Sedition prosecutions had also become unusual by the late nineteenth century, being viewed as controversial and
risky because of the possibility of jury acquittals. the continuing need
for that offence also seemed obviated by more comprehensive breach-ofthe-peace offences and new institutional means to enforce them. But, as
desmond H. Brown and Barry Wright observed in the previous volume,
the opportunity to defne sedition more narrowly during the drafting of
the 1892 Canadian Criminal Code, by specifying the required intent and
thereby moving decisively away from the older elastic common law elements of the offence, had been missed. this would have serious implications when the offcial climate once again favoured sedition prosecutions,
namely during the First World War and in response to post-war labour
radicalism.18
moreover, a wartime measure (order-in-Council PC 2384) that outlawed organizations advocating economic or political change by force
supplemented the political offence of sedition. it continued in effect after
the war, by way of 1919 Criminal Code amendments (the addition of section 97, later renumbered and better known as section 98); and changes to
sedition provisions, notably the elimination of the “lawful criticism” saving clause in section 133 and an increase in maximum sentences from two
to twenty years. in the 1926 elections, mackenzie King promised to repeal
section 98, and several repeal bills were subsequently passed by the House
only to be defeated by the Conservative majority in the Senate. Some of the
other retrograde changes to sedition law introduced in 1919 were eventually reversed, and section 98 was eventually repealed in 1936.19
the traditional political offences, as restated in the 1892 Criminal Code
and extended by amendments, were supplemented by modern nationalsecurity laws that refected the wider reach and institutional capabilities
of the twentieth-century state.20 the period covered by this volume saw
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the expansion of civilian surveillance, accompanied by modern secrecy
and espionage legislation. adopted from contemporary British legislation, new laws in these areas had been included in the 1892 Code and
were elaborated at london’s behest during the 1914–39 period. However,
secrecy and espionage did not fgure as prominently as security concerns
in Canada as they did in the united Kingdom. there were no major cases
of Canadians passing secrets to hostile powers in the period. By far the
most important new Canadian national-security law, alluded to above,
was the War measures act, 1914. this emergency executive-enabling legislation plays a central role in the fve chapters in this volume relating to
the First World War and had a considerable post-war legacy, notably by
way of the above-mentioned 1919 amendments to the Criminal Code and
related amendments to the immigration act.
the main national-security issues in Canada during the First World
War revolved around enemy aliens, conscription, and military justice. afterwards, aliens remained a concern and so the government continued
exclusionary measures such as limitations on entry and naturalization,
combined with the use of deportation, and suspension of civil rights. in
addition, worries about radicalism grew rapidly from 1919 into a major
government security preoccupation focused on potential revolutionary
challenges to the political, economic, and cultural status quo. against this
background, we now offer a closer look at the laws and security measures
deployed during the 1914–39 period and the concerns they were designed
to address.
The War Measures Act: War Emergency Powers and Beyond
the War measures act, passed at the outset of the First World War, became
permanent executive-enabling legislation to deal with the security challenges posed by modern war and similar emergencies. Before the twentieth century, serious security emergencies were, as noted earlier, met by
way of emergency legislation of limited duration, wider exercise of prerogative powers, and, in extreme situations, the extension of martial law
and military justice to civilians. the Wma introduced a new approach.
Parliament was instead called upon to ratify the declaration of emergency
and, in so doing, delegate legislative authority to pass emergency regulations to the executive branch of government. this had signifcant advantages. it avoided the controversial and constitutionally questionable
reliance on prerogative powers or the extreme step of subjecting civilians
to martial law and military justice. it also avoided the delays and risks
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governments potentially faced in seeking to secure passage in Parliament of temporary emergency legislation on a piecemeal basis. as will
be discussed, the effect of the Wma was retroactive and the act remained
law beyond the parliamentary session during which it was passed. While
regulations under its authority would expire, the act itself required no
renewal. nor was it repealed at the end of the war. any questions about
its potential application to emergencies other than war were laid to rest by
an amendment in 1927 that clarifed the reference to “apprehended insurrection.” the government invoked this power again during the Second
World War and in 1970 in response to the declared state of “apprehended
insurrection” during the october Crisis. in 1988 the Wma was substantially revised and retitled the emergencies act.21
the Wma authorized cabinet to issue orders-in-council deemed necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, and welfare of Canada
once Parliament ratifed a declaration of a war or similar emergency. Parliament’s legislative authority for these matters was in effect delegated
to cabinet for the duration of the declared emergency. Cabinet was thus
given a free hand to issue orders or regulations for any defence or security
purpose, including matters as serious as detention without trial and summary deportation, censorship and communications, transportation, and
production and appropriation, along with attendant summary powers
and penalties. the unfettered discretion also reduced the need for governments to launch legal actions or risky prosecutions for political offences
after the fact.
murray Greenwood has argued that Parliament in 1914 never explicitly
voted for continuation of the Wma beyond the end of the Great War,
nor for the general principle of its potential peacetime application. inadequate scrutiny, lack of vigilance, and complacency on the part of parliamentarians, a tendency shared by the press and supported by the general
public’s attitudes of deference to authority and early war fervour, facilitated the sweeping legislative delegation of emergency powers to executive authority.22
Greenwood notes that, as hostilities commenced, Prime minister Borden’s Conservative government understood that the war effort, on a
magnitude and geographic scale not seen since the napoleonic conficts,
would require unprecedented legislative powers. this would be the case
even if Germany and its allies were quickly defeated, as many expected.
temporary emergency legislation, the traditional means relied on to regulate enemy aliens, ban secret societies, suspend habeas corpus, and enact various procedural expedients to facilitate the prosecution of political
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offences, would require renewal each legislative session. Such conventional legislation would not suffce, it was suggested, since modern conditions required fexible and detailed regulations to deal with these matters
and for the effective and strategic control of information, transportation,
and production.23
When the dominion Parliament met for a special war session in midaugust 1914, Westminster had already enacted the defence of the realm
act (4&5 Geo. V, c.29), known as “dora,” a relatively modest delegation
of emergency legislative powers to the executive expressly enacted to be
in effect only during the continuation of the war.24 Canada’s minister of
justice, Charles doherty, did not initially expect Parliament to agree to
an open-ended delegation of legislative power to the executive and some
opposition mPs expressed a preference for keeping Parliament in continuous session. the process of enactment of the Wma throws light on how
major legislation can be adopted by a series of almost inadvertent steps.
draft legislation, produced by the department of Justice’s W.F. o’Connor,
proposed a blanket act, one that would delegate a general power of executive regulation for security or defence purposes. doherty, Borden,
Solicitor General arthur meighen, and former deputy minister of justice
Zebulon lash were persuaded by o’Connor’s argument that enumerated matters of regulation would result in omissions requiring ongoing
legislative amendments, as was in fact already experienced in the united
Kingdom with dora. after consulting with Wilfrid laurier, liberal mP
edward macdonald responded that the government should omit no special power needed to support the war effort and, without seeing a legislative draft, assured the government of his party’s support. a number of
reporters covering the special war session of Parliament assumed that the
proposal involved minor amendments to the Criminal Code and immigration act.25 unsurprisingly, examination of the bill in Parliament was
perfunctory,26 and, in the country at large, its provisions received minimal
attention. Greenwood’s survey of a dozen newspapers and periodicals reveals scant coverage of the bill, with neither editorial comment nor published criticism.27 Yet, in addition to the sweeping delegation of legislative
powers to the executive, the act also had retroactive effect so that there
would be no legal challenges to the arrest and detention of aliens from the
beginning of august.28
the wide-reaching powers conferred by the Wma, including matters
under provincial jurisdiction, were later upheld by the Supreme Court of
Canada (SCC) and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) as
falling under the federal jurisdiction to pass laws for the “peace, order and
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good government of Canada.”29 in the 1918 SCC case In re George Edwin
Gray, examined at length in Patricia mcmahon’s chapter in this volume,
some judges did express the view that the delegation of legislative powers to the executive should be limited in substance to specifed matters, or
to such times as Parliament is not in session. the question of whether the
Wma was intended to have peacetime application was not addressed,
although it was raised over sixty years later during the october Crisis of
1970.30 in the 1914 debates Borden and doherty had said nothing about
the issue or post-war implications, and as Greenwood notes, “the judgements rendered in the case [Gray] ranged far and wide on the scope of the
Wma but no statement was made indicating a peacetime application.”31
Greenwood also points out that no proclamation of apprehended insurrection was issued in response to the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike, and
no prosecutions were taken under the wartime order-in-council (PC 2384)
after 11 november 1918. However, that order was not explicitly repealed
until april 1919, when it was replaced by the Criminal Code amendments
and new deportation provisions in the immigration act referred to earlier.
and ambiguities in the statutory language in the original version of the
Wma, which might suggest that it could be invoked only during wartime,
were dealt with in a 1927 revision. the amended act eliminated exclusive
references to “war” in a number of provisions and made it clear that the
mention of “war” in its short title was intended as a general reference
to emergency.32 the 1927 amendment removed all doubt that the Wma
was more than an ad hoc war measure. it became a generic emergency
powers/executive-enabling statute that went well beyond contemporary
British equivalents.
the Wma serves as a powerful example of a theme emphasized in much
of Greenwood’s scholarship, and a concern that motivated his founding of
the Canadian State Trials series: the recurring tendency of Canadian governments, abetted by public deference to authority, to pass more draconian crisis legislation than that found in British precedents and to push
shared British constitutional principles to their limit in relation to security
matters.33
Civilian Surveillance and Espionage
the 1914–18 war marked a qualitative and quantitative change in the
state’s treatment of civilian populations. the control and internment of
residents originating from nations at war with Britain and its allies was
extended much further than previously experienced and the array of
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wartime measures affected most Canadians. the new regime was national, widespread, and relatively effective. in the name of security and
counter-intelligence, new approaches were used to control means of communication whether old or new. the press, the mail, broadcasting, and
publishing and printing were subject to voluntary or imposed censorship,
and most private radio stations were closed down.34 Surveillance of persons identifed as non-conforming whether by the dominion and royal
north-West mounted Police (rnWmP) or local police became the norm, a
practice that, as previously mentioned, weighed especially heavily on enemy aliens and on radical labour leaders. imperial legislation and British
coordination of security and intelligence throughout the empire (as seen
with the Komagata Maru affair in 1914) were also important infuences
on the status and treatment of aliens and approaches to espionage. the
u.K. alien restriction act, 1914 (4&5 Geo. V, c.12) was sent to dominion
and colonial governments, which were urged to adopt registration procedures, and the offcial Secrets act, 1911 had imperial effect.35
after the outbreak of war and in a period marked by general uncertainty,
public sentiment in favour of control measures was fanned by unfounded
and exaggerated rumours. German spies were the focus of many stories
while others concerned possible attacks on Canada from enemy nationals
resident in the united States, or risks of German sabotage.36 adding to
popular concern was the proximity of the still-neutral united States with
large German and irish populations potentially hostile to Great Britain.
this situation encouraged talk that local agents’ communications with
Germany were being maintained via the united States.37 Such rumours
and fears seem exaggerated but there were areas of serious threat, such
as, for instance, the presence in the united States of four hundred thousand or more immigrants of German or austro-Hungarian origin; many
of the men would have done military service in their countries of origin
and would be considered reservists for the German or austro-Hungarian
armies, creating a confict of loyalties.
the rumours and reports encouraged the general perspective that
methods of surveillance were a necessary feature of the new war. there
was, however, no formal system of Canadian agents or organizations designed to protect internal state security during the First World War and, in
practice, many measures of repression and control were implemented in
piecemeal fashion. responsibilities were divided with the police in charge
of certain approaches, whether local, provincial, or national forces, and
for other purposes the militia or military. in effect, in the absence of a unifed security service until the post-war period, various organizations were
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created or drawn in to take responsibility for measures instituted by the
government. For example, the dominion Police were given responsibility
for preventing sabotage when several serious attempts or incidents took
place in 1914 and 1915,38 while the military took responsibility for overseeing enemy aliens in august 1914.39 But, by october 1914, responsibility
for aliens had been transferred to a new organization under the Canadian
militia40 and, in 1915, to the department of Justice.41
it might be suggested that some state activity fell close to the scope of
what would now be termed “counter-intelligence,” where the term is
taken to refer to “information gathered and activities conducted to protect
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations
conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons.”42
this may be an overly generous application of the term. the police conducted direct surveillance routinely against members of organizations
and other individuals suspected of being, or known to be, opposed to the
war in europe and used infltration methods against the industrial Workers of the World (iWW), the Communist Party of Canada, and some labour unions. these activities provided the police with an insider’s view
of the target organizations’ operations and produced evidence for prosecutions.43 But it is questionable whether the surveillance was suffciently
intensive and effective or the selected targets threatening enough for the
activities to qualify for recognition as forms of “counter-intelligence.”44
in fact, few residents of Canada appear to have been working on behalf of enemy powers, probably only a small handful. in effect, much of
the state-sanctioned surveillance activity was aimed at symbolically supporting the war effort by singling out non-conforming organizations or
persons in an effort to control their communications, perhaps primarily to
demonstrate that the authorities were vigilant. it was what these organizations and their members said, rather than what they did, that troubled
the authorities during the early part of the war.45 military intelligence and
counter-intelligence operations continued to operate after the war, and
after 1920, when the dominion Police merged with the rnWmP to form
the royal Canadian mounted Police (rCmP), a dedicated unifed civilian
security branch emerged with full responsibility for national security; its
activities are discussed further below.46
Canada’s offcial secrets and espionage laws provide the background
to these surveillance activities. legislation in this area, modelled on 1889
u.K. legislation, had been introduced shortly before the enactment of
the Canadian Criminal Code. the passing of state secrets to enemy powers had traditionally been met by treason and sedition prosecutions but
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concerns about effective modern spy laws had grown in Britain in the
late nineteenth century, particularly in relation to the disclosure of sensitive government and technological information.47 Provisions in the 1889
legislation relating to secrecy and breach of offcial trust became sections
76–79 of the Code, remaining part of it until elaborated in a separate offcial Secrets act in 1939.48
the u.K. government had soon found the 1889 legislation inadequate.
the press helped mobilize opposition to amending bills in 1896 and 1908
but by 1911 a series of spy scandals, Germany’s growing militarization,
and popular spy literature (by writers such as erskine Childers and William le Queux) had created a more receptive political climate for passage
of the sweeping offcial Secrets act. espionage or spying and leakage of
secrets continued as the main offences but espionage no longer required
proof of intentional damage to the state and military secrets were further
protected. Prohibited disclosure ceased to be limited to crown servants
and government contractors. it extended to the press and all persons not
authorized to receive information and the defnition of unauthorized
communication broadened to cover information, whether classifed or
not, disclosed “for the beneft of any foreign power or other manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state.” in-camera proceedings and
reverse-onus procedural expedients were introduced. the 1911 u.K. act
was listed in the 1912 Statutes of Canada as an applicable imperial act and
so it extended to offences committed in any part of the empire.49
However, as noted, secrecy and espionage concerns did not fgure
prominently within Canada in this period and the older provisions remained in the Canadian Criminal Code (becoming sections 85 and 86 in
the 1927 revisions). ottawa enacted a separate offcial Secrets act only
in 1939, adopting the u.K. 1911 act and its 1920 amendment as domestic law.50 as we shall see in the next volume, concerns generated by the
1945 Gouzenko affair, other spy crises in the late 1940s, and the Korean
War led to numerous offcial Secrets act prosecutions and the further
development of espionage provisions in the Criminal Code.51 together
these laws provided an expanding mandate for the rCmP security branch
and for the development of intelligence and counter-intelligence operations in other departments that expanded the scope of civilian surveillance and the range of domestic targets. in the longer term, the secrecy
laws also supplemented and largely displaced sedition as means of restricting expression and open and accountable government, facilitating
compliance within the public service and creating a chilling effect on the
press.
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Conscription
the conscription issue arguably had as broad a social impact as the wartime
treatment of aliens but was even more divisive. it was to become part of the
historical perspective of succeeding generations of Québécois. at the time
it created a crisis in French-english relations – possibly the deepest since
Confederation, even worse than that produced by the riel affair. and it
fanned earlier english-French conficts such as the manitoba schools question and the restrictions on French-language education in ontario. it began
in 1916 when the Conservative government recognized that the supply of
volunteers for the war effort in europe was falling rapidly and seemed unlikely to rebound.52 over time and as a result of the government’s handling
of the situation, the conscription issue became a national drama that spun
out over two years, with lasting political effects in Quebec.
the timing of the rapid decrease in Canadian enlistment was a serious issue since the British and allies’ need for manpower had never been
greater. the losses in the battles of 1916 in Flanders and on the Somme
had been very high and the tasks before the allies accentuated the need
for more and more men. enthusiasm for Canada’s war effort had greatly
diminished and was lowest in Quebec, where ultramontane French Canadians felt little allegiance to republican, anti-clerical France and even less
towards the united Kingdom. Furthermore, enlistment in the predominantly english-speaking battalions of the Canadian army held little attraction for francophones.53 outside Quebec, enrolment in the army had
been viewed more favourably but enthusiasm faded over time. enlistment had offered employment early in the war, after the hard years of
1913–14, but by 1916 the potential costs were seen as too high. Conscription threatened to deprive both agriculture and essential war industries
of vital manpower. the generally tight labour market in agriculture had
reduced support for the war effort among farmers, while other employers,
including those not profting from wartime conditions, also faced labour
shortages. moreover, the task of enumerating Canadian labour resources
and allocating the right proportions to military, agricultural, and industrial requirements was new to the government and beyond its capabilities
to administer effciently. as a result, manpower policy in 1914–18 was
impromptu and reactive.
Borden’s Conservatives had previously shown great reluctance to impose conscription but their position changed after Borden’s stay in the
united Kingdom from February to may 1917, when he discussed the military situation with his fellow prime ministers, Canadian generals, and the
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soldiers themselves. during this visit, the russian war effort was thrown
into doubt with the tsar’s abdication in march 1917. in a world of hard
choices, when the outcome of the war was very much in doubt and its duration was anyone’s guess, Borden concluded that the country’s primary
obligation was to the army and its allies. in may 1917 his government
introduced the military Service act.54 under the statute, enlistment for
overseas service was frst made compulsory for all men between the ages
of twenty and twenty-four who were single or widowers without children. the act included an appeal process, which was soon swamped with
applications; one estimate is that 94 per cent of more than 400,000 eligible
men fled appeals.55
Borden’s government, faced with the possibility of defeat in the election
scheduled for 13 december 1917, had formed a coalition including leading
fgures from the opposition liberals. during the election campaign, conscription became the most contentious and divisive issue ever put to the
Canadian electorate and Borden responded by enfranchising all soldiers
as well as giving votes to their wives, widows, sisters and mothers, and
by exempting farmers’ sons from conscription. laurier’s liberals were effectively split on the conscription issue, with the result that the unionist
Party won handily, although laurier won resoundingly in Quebec, dividing the country further along linguistic lines.56
the level of anti-conscription sentiment among many elements in the
province of Quebec led to an outbreak of rioting at easter, 1918. demonstrations began after the police demanded exemption papers from a
young man in Quebec City and, when he failed to produce them, arrested
him. the arrest symbolized for Canadiens the regime of surveillance by
police and military authorities of all men of military age. Such was the
public’s resentment that large crowds gathered to protest the arrest and,
by Sunday, 30 march, the authorities had summoned military aid to the
civil power. the reinforcements came in the form of english Canadian
soldiers, a circumstance guaranteed to worsen the situation. there was
ensuing violence and exchanges of gunfre that resulted in the deaths of
four civilians and the wounding of fve soldiers and ffty civilians before
crowds dispersed.57
the German armies launched a spring offensive in march 1918, which
was a severe shock to the British and French armies and once again drove
home the crucial importance of maintaining manpower, especially since
american soldiers seemed unlikely to join the action in a decisive way in
the short term. three weeks after the riots, in may 1918, Borden’s cabinet
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moved again, this time to halt all exemptions from military service using
the simple expedient of cancelling the appeal process, a decision effected
by an order-in-council under the Wma.58 Previously exempt recruits in
the frst category to be conscripted, including many sons of farmers, were
profoundly alienated by the move, especially in Quebec. in practice, however, only a small percentage of conscripted men were sent overseas; those
who were sent, by all accounts, fought well enough and supplied the manpower necessary for the Canadian expeditionary Force (CeF) to maintain
its fghting edge to the end.
Military Justice
military trials were a notable feature of the First World War and have
been written about extensively; they remain controversial, especially the
executions of a small percentage of convicted soldiers. in legal-historical
terms, the reputation of such trials for relative harshness, arbitrariness,
and rapid procedures – at least during a considerable part of the past two
centuries – has made them appear an anomaly compared with common
law criminal trials in most jurisdictions. as a result, military justice has
been viewed by civilian lawyers as a blunt and at times unfair instrument.
the prevailing military perspective has been the opposite: namely, that
conduct by soldiers failing to carry out orders – categorized, for instance,
as offences of desertion or mutiny or cowardice – must necessarily be subject to swift trials and severe and exemplary punishment. underlying this
view is the unquestioned assumption that, for an army to be effective,
soldiers at a minimum must obey orders and be ready and willing to fght.
during the First World War, twenty-fve Canadian soldiers were executed after conviction by military tribunals,59 the great majority for the
offence of desertion.60 this compares with a total of 346 executions of offcers and soldiers by British authorities.61 it should be noted, however, that
about 90 per cent of capital sentences imposed by tribunals on soldiers
from all allied countries were commuted62 and that those appearing before military tribunals for serious offences represented a minute proportion of fghting men.63 according to Chris madsen, “upwards of 16,000
courts-martial took place within the Canadian expeditionary Force between 1914 and 1920”; most were for minor offences.64
the term “military justice” is perhaps misleading when the goal of
military discipline had been and remains the fghting effectiveness of citizen soldiers. in this view, as stated, military justice has necessarily to be
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administered promptly and to have a powerful deterrent effect.65 in practice, this meant, as many commentators have noted, that those executed
were not necessarily the most obdurate cases but in some instances soldiers who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.
the Canadian militia act had been updated in 190466 and the department of militia and defence formed in 1906. throughout the First World
War, Canadian forces fought under the British High Command and came
under the same system of military law as all British subjects fghting in the
imperial and dominion forces.67 Canadian military discipline followed
the King’s regulations and Orders and, at the outset, those accused of major
offences appeared before British military tribunals.68 in the early period
of the war, Canadian offcers handled summary offences while serious offences were likely to be brought before courts-martial composed of British
offcers. the Canadian government did not object to the arrangement and
neither did new Zealand’s or South africa’s governments – two colonies
also deeply committed to the war.69 in contrast, the australian government refused on constitutional grounds to allow British military trials of
australian soldiers.70 From 1916 onwards, tribunals were more likely to
be staffed by Canadian offcers. the make-up of Canada’s fghting men
began to change after passage of the military Service act, 1917 71 and, once
exemptions from compulsory service were withdrawn in may 1918, the
majority of new recruits were conscripts.
it seems that the British judge advocate general, or probably his Canadian counterpart after 1916, reviewed all case fles and considered sentences from hearings of allegations of serious offences before penalties
were carried out. of the twenty-fve executed Canadian soldiers, fve out
of twenty-one executed for desertion were from the 22nd (French Canadian) Battalion where discipline was a continuing problem;72 two soldiers
executed for murder had killed an offcer; and two executed for cowardice
were considered repeat offenders.
a good deal of information has been published recently on the context or setting of court-martial cases of Canadian soldiers.73 it is less well
known that such proceedings continued after the peace of 11 november
1918; for example, as a result of the resistance of French Canadian conscripts to being sent to Siberia in 1919 as part of the Siberian expeditionary
Force, ten soldiers were tried by a Canadian military tribunal in Vladivostok for “mutinous conduct” (see Benjamin isitt’s chapter). two months
after those trials, a major series of courts-martial in the united Kingdom
followed the riot of several hundred Canadian troops awaiting long-delayed demobilization and repatriation at Kinmel Park in north Wales.74
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Political and Labour Radicalism
the levels of political and labour radicalism varied enormously over the
period covered by this volume, rising during and immediately following
the First World War, receding during the 1920s, and then resurging in the
Great depression. the government’s response to both waves of radicalism was to turn towards coercion. during the war the government ruled
through the Wma and exercised its powers to intern resident aliens, prohibit enemy-language publications, and outlaw radical organizations. But
that was not all.75 in 1918 it issued PC 815, the infamous “anti-loafng” law
that made it an offence, punishable by a fne of $100 or six months in jail
in default of payment, for an adult male not to be “regularly engaged in
some useful occupation.” although striking workers were exempt from
its application, the order was used against union organizers and radical
agitators. other orders tightened up the enforcement of the industrial
disputes investigations act (idia), the keystone of federal labour policy,
which required that strikes and lockouts be postponed in covered industries until after conciliation was completed, to address union defance of
the law.76 Fear of police unionism led to PC 2213 prohibiting the mounties
from joining or associating with any union or organization of employees.
Finally, just before the end of the war, the government banned all strikes
in industries covered by the idia, which had been extended to all war
production in 1916.77
in addition to these orders-in-council, the government (and employers) also had “normal” law at their disposal, the importance of which increased once the government’s emergency powers lapsed at the war’s end
and after the orders-in-council were eventually rescinded (the last ones
in 1921). But, as dennis molinaro explores in more detail in his chapter,
some emergency powers became permanent as the government prepared
to confront the labour unrest that intensifed after the armistice. in particular, section 97/98 of the Criminal Code, passed in 1919, built on PC
2384, the order that enabled the government to declare an organization
unlawful if it advocated economic or political change by force or violence
and to punish members, seize and forfeit the organization’s property to
the crown, and prosecute anyone who knowingly permitted such as organization to meet on premises he or she owned or rented. Section 98 followed along similar lines, except that, unlike PC 2384, it did not enable the
government to declare organizations unlawful. rather, the illegality of the
organization would have to be established judicially in the context of trials
of individuals who were prosecuted under its provisions.78
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the government also enhanced its deportation powers with a view to
using them to rid the country of the British-born leaders of the Winnipeg
General Strike. the 1906 immigration act had been amended in 1910, with
a new section 41, to allow the immigration department to deport anyone
other than a Canadian citizen who advocated the overthrow by force or
violence of the government or of constituted law or authority, or who by
word or deed created or attempted to create riot or public disorder.79 Yet
this did not apply to the British-born, who became citizens by their domicile in Canada. Consequently, in 1919 section 41 was amended so that only
those born or naturalized in Canada were exempt from its provisions, and
since British-born strike leaders gained citizenship by domicile and not by
naturalization,80 they were now deportable. additionally, the provision
was made retroactive to 1910 so that a person who had fallen within that
class since the original enactment of section 41 was deportable. Finally,
even being naturalized was not a guarantee of immunity from political
deportation, since the naturalization act was also amended to allow disaffected or disloyal persons to have their naturalization revoked, making
them subject to section 41.81
the use of these powers against political and labour radicals is the
subject of a number of the chapters in this book, but it will be useful to
identify some general issues that run across the period and are not fully
captured in those studies. First, it is fair to say that prosecutions for political offences were relatively infrequent during this period, although we
lack a count both of the total number of political prosecutions, including
charges under sections 98 and 132 (seditious conspiracy and seditious libel, section 133 after 1927) and deportations under section 41. However,
relatively infrequent usage of these laws should not lead to the conclusion that they were unimportant. High-profle political prosecutions were
a risky endeavour, but when successful they sent a strong message about
the seriousness with which the government viewed the actors and actions
involved; moreover, in the case of section 98 prosecutions, the result was
a judicial fnding that an organization was unlawful, which could then
justify further actions against other members, including deportation for
those subject to section 41 of the immigration act. immigration authorities, however, had their choice of many possible grounds for deporting
radical aliens and preferred to use other legal categories, such as becoming a public charge. the reason for this, according to Barbara roberts, was
that “the department could avoid unfavourable publicity, make legal appeals against deportation more diffcult and less effective, and make the
administrative management of deportation smoother, more effcient, and
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easier.”82 and all of this could be justifed bureaucratically as being within
the spirit of a law that authorized political deportations, while leaving
no traceable record of the true number of people deported for political
reasons.
Secondly, a focus on explicitly political prosecutions and deportations
can defect our attention away from the use of criminal law provisions
protecting public order. For example, unlawful assemblies were broadly
defned to include three or more people with a common intent to carry out
a common purpose that causes people in the neighbourhood to fear on
reasonable grounds that the persons so assembled will disturb the peace
tumultuously or provoke others to do so. a tumultuous disturbance, if it
did occur, was defned as a riot. not only were members of unlawful assemblies and rioters guilty of an indictable offence, but the riot act could
be read, requiring those assembled to disperse immediately.83 the failure
to do so provided the police, sometimes with the aid of the militia, all the
justifcation they needed to forcibly disperse the crowd, sometime with
fatal results, as in the actions taken to break up the on-to-ottawa trekkers
in regina, an episode discussed in Bill Waiser’s chapter in this volume.
at a more mundane level, the criminal law also regulated picket-line behaviour through its section on watching and besetting. Peaceful picketing had been expressly excluded from criminal watching and besetting
in 1876,84 but the exclusion was inadvertently omitted from the Criminal
Code in 1892. Some judges interpreted the absence of the exclusion as intentional and labour unions demanded that protection of peaceful picketing be reinserted. However, the federal government dragged its heels and
it was only in 1939 that the exemption of peaceful picketing from criminal
watching and besetting was restored.85 of course, violence, threats of violence, and intimidation were covered by the Code and these offences were
subject to interpretation and were sometimes applied selectively to limit
picketing activity. Finally, the vagrancy provision provided police with
an enormous degree of discretion in its application, as the on-to-ottawa
trekkers discovered.86
discussions of legal control of public order cannot be limited to the
criminal law. at the federal level, there was legislation other than the
immigration act that added to the federal government’s power. For example, as the depression hit and the federal government was pressed to
provide resources to support the unemployed, it enacted legislation that
authorized it to issue “all such orders and regulations as may be deemed
necessary or desirable for … maintaining peace, order and good government throughout Canada.” in defending the measure against criticism
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from mackenzie King and J.S. Woodsworth that it undermined the rule
of law, r.J. manion, the minister of railways and canals, asserted that the
power was necessary for keeping “the bolshevists in order by force.”87
municipal offcials also sometime played an important role, although
the legal basis for their actions was not always obvious. For instance,
during the Winnipeg General Strike, in response to large and frequent
marches by pro- and anti-strike veterans, and intensifed picketing, the
mayor issued a proclamation, drafted by a.J. andrews, leader of the Citizens’ Committee of 1000 opposing the strike, banning public gatherings
and parades.88 in toronto, the Police Commission prohibited public meetings in foreign languages in the fall of 1928 as part of its effort to supress
the Communist menace, and threatened hall owners that their licences
would be revoked if they permitted such meetings on their premises. efforts to organize free-speech protests in Queen’s Park or make soapbox
speeches at other outdoor locations were broken up by police, who forcibly dispersed the crowds and arrested participants on charges ranging
from vagrancy to disorderly conduct.89 and, when the unemployed organized demonstrations in the early 1930s, they were often denied permits
and faced bans on public meetings.90
Closely related to the laws themselves were the decisions made about
their enforcement. Policing offcials are always faced with choices about
how widely to interpret and how strictly to enforce the law. While it is impossible to generalize, and there was certainly signifcant variation in offcial responses to marches and picket lines, it is fair to say that there were
a large number of instances in which restrictive laws were expansively interpreted and vigorously applied to limit the space for public protest. the
militia was called up three times during wartime strikes, but six times in
the post-war confrontations of 1919 and then another four times between
1921 and 1923.91 as a result of the heavy reliance on the militia, in 1919
the government amended the militia act to increase the maximum permanent force from 5,000 to 10,000.92 However, the federal government’s
enthusiasm for making the militia available to aid the civil power began to
wane after the election of the liberals in 1921 and in response to the use of
troops in the Cape Breton strike in 1922 and then again in 1923 (discussed
in david Frank’s chapter), in both cases on the signature of a judge. the
ease with which extraordinary force could be requisitioned, and its great
cost, convinced the federal government to amend the act to require that
the provincial attorney general concur with the request from local offcials
and to make the province, not the municipality, responsible for the cost.93
this had some deterrent effect and the militia was called out only two
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more times to address labour unrest, once in response to the strike of coal
miners in estevan, Saskatchewan, in 1931 after police fred on a motorcade
of striking workers and their families, killing three and wounding eight,
and for the fnal time, in Stratford, ontario, during a strike by furniture
and poultry processing workers in 1933.94
despite the concern about the lack of adequate controls on calling out
the militia, generally speaking it was an exceptional event. For the most
part, policing fell to municipal and provincial forces, under the control of
their respective government offcials. Here, too, however, while tolerance
for public demonstrations and picketing varied, offcials tended to tilt toward the repressive, as was demonstrated by the actions of toronto police
in trying to prevent Communist activity in the late 1920s; the provincial
police in nova Scotia, who attacked labour protestors in Cape Breton (discussed in Frank’s chapter); the municipal police in montreal, who established a “red Squad” and worked closely with provincial police and the
rCmP to monitor and disrupt the Communist Party and leftist organizations (discussed in andrée lévesque’s chapter); and the municipal police
and the rCmP in regina, Saskatchewan, who triggered a riot by using
excessive force while trying to arrest leaders of the on-to-ottawa trek
(discussed in Waiser’s chapter).
Behind public policing, there lurked the secretive operations of Canada’s political police, who went undercover to keep tabs on and investigate the activities of radicals and dissidents. the First World War and the
Wma provided fertile ground for the growth of these operations as the
dominion Police and the rnWmP, often operating with the assistance of
private police agencies hired by employers, kept a careful watch on labour organizers and provided intelligence to the government that became
the basis for issuing repressive orders-in-council. these efforts intensifed during the post-war conficts as police operatives infltrated radical
organizations and, on occasion, surfaced to testify against offcials, such
as in the prosecution of r.B. russell, one of the Winnipeg strike leaders
(discussed in reinhold Kramer and tom mitchell’s chapter). as noted,
the dominion Police were merged into the rnWmP to form the rCmP
in 1920, which was given complete jurisdiction over national security. Between 1920 and 1929, the rCmP opened at least 6,767 subject fles on radicalism and 4,806 fles on suspected radicals.95 Political policing intensifed
during the depression and played a prominent role in planning raids
against Communist Party offces and arresting offcials and activists. John
leopold, a police agent who had infltrated the party, was the star witness
at the trial of the Communist leadership in toronto in 1931 (discussed
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in molinaro’s chapter). these convictions required a judicial determination that the party was an illegal organization under section 98 and, once
that was made, a broader crackdown followed in which the secret police
played a prominent role identifying activists to be arrested and, in some
cases, deported.96
in the face of these repressive measures, radicals were not passive victims. indeed, one notable development of this period was the formation of
the Canadian labour defense league (Cldl) in 1925, perhaps Canada’s
frst organization created to provide legal aid to persons facing political
prosecutions and deportations. initially, the Cldl was formed to defend
seventy-fve members of the mine Workers union of Canada, arrested for
picket-line activity during a strike in drumheller, alberta. although not
all the individuals who formed the Cldl were Communists, the latter
dominated the organization, beginning with its leader for most of its existence, a.e. Smith. the organization had 350 branches, many sponsored
by ethnic organizations, and 20,000 members at its high point. the Cldl
played a major role in defending individuals arrested during the freespeech struggles in toronto in the late 1920s, the leaders of the Communist Party who were arrested in 1931 and charged under section 98, and
numerous foreign-born activists facing deportation. it defended over six
thousand individuals in the inter-war years. ironically, one of the people
to whom it provided legal representation was its leader, a.e. Smith, who
was indicted for sedition in 1934 after giving a speech in which he accused
Prime minister r.B. Bennett of giving the order to have tim Buck, the
leader of the Communist Party, assassinated in his jail cell while serving
a sentence in the Kingston penitentiary after being convicted under section 98 in 1931. Smith was acquitted. the Cldl not only acted as a legaldefence agency but also played a major role in the campaign for the repeal
of section 98. it extracted a promise of repeal from mackenzie King, then
the leader of the liberal opposition, and King kept his word after becoming prime minister in 1935. However, at the same time, section 133 was
also amended to preserve some aspects of the discredited law (discussed
in molinaro’s chapter). 97
overview of chapters
the volume is broadly divided into two main chronological periods, the
First World War and the two decades that followed. there is nonetheless considerable overlap in the legal responses and the war left a legacy
of discrimination and ongoing government security concerns. as noted,
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some temporary wartime orders issued under the Wma continued in
effect after the war through amendments to the Criminal Code and immigration act. immigrant groups continued to be a security concern in
the post-war period. and processes of military justice and wartime intelligence operations continued in the post-war period and were extended to
growing concerns about labour radicalism.
as was the case with the previous volumes in this series, the span of
time covered necessitated diffcult editorial decisions about what cases
and topics to include. our defnition of terms and legal focus provided
the main criteria for our selection. the chapters that follow refect a range
of legal responses to real or perceived security threats and aim to be representative and relatively comprehensive. However, it is inevitable that
some topics are omitted or only briefy touched on, such as the resorts to
military aid to the civil power during the conscription crisis and the Winnipeg and Cape Breton strikes. the Cldl legal challenges to the Halifax
deportations of Communists and the attempts by government to intervene over labour support for the republicans during the Spanish Civil
War are other examples.
the chapter by Bohdan Kordan opens the volume with an examination of the local impact of wartime measures including alien registration
and internment without trial and a range of other forms of discrimination.
Kordan’s chapter outlines the diffcult circumstances faced by immigrants
from enemy nations and the domestic policy considerations that led to
early wartime measures against them. He focuses on the development of
the alien-registration process, implemented by order-in-Council PC 2721
under the Wma, and the consequences of registration. these initial state
requirements were crucial in paving the way to the later suspension of habeas corpus and internment. For a signifcant number of those identifed
as “enemy aliens,” PC 2721 led directly to sweeping arrests and indefnite detention, in most cases on the basis of status rather than evidence of
any hostile activity. as noted earlier, about two-thirds of those interned in
Canada during the Great War were civilian residents, an experience that
is fully examined in Kordan’s recent book.98
Peter mcdermott’s chapter surveys the broader imperial context of
wartime measures, compares approaches taken in the united Kingdom
and australia, and examines the constitutional and legal issues that arose.
as we have seen, executive orders under the u.K. defence of the realm
act were relatively limited in scope compared with the Wma. the aliens
restriction act, 1914 further regulated the activities of aliens in Britain but internments there were ultimately the result of the prerogative
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powers of the crown. in Canada and australia, internments were the result of sweeping legislation. Both dominions had comparatively large immigrant populations, many originating from enemy powers, and interned
relatively larger numbers than the united Kingdom, including naturalized British subjects of German birth or origin, despite their great distance from hostilities. Wider-ranging discriminatory measures included
Canada’s 1917 Wartime elections act, which was infuenced by similar
australian legislation.
Jonathan Swainger’s chapter follows the impact of general wartime
restrictions on civilians who spoke out against the war or expressed
themselves in a manner considered detrimental to the war effort. His
examination of prosecutions for seditious utterances focuses on western
Canada, where prosecutions occurred with considerable frequency compared with the rest of the country during the early years of the war. most
were directed against individuals from enemy countries and the rate fell
off sharply as the war went into its third and fourth years, probably in
part the result of diminishing jingoism and weakening pro-war attitudes
among the public. Swainger suggests that more rational views of the low
level of risk these cases presented prevailed among superior court judges
who heard appeals from convictions. He concludes that efforts were made
by the courts to temper prevailing wartime anti-alien sentiment and discourage the use of such prosecutions.
the issues of conscription and the sudden withdrawal of most possibilities for exemptions underlie the 1918 appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, In re George Edwin Gray, examined by Patricia mcmahon. mcmahon’s
chapter investigates the unexpected background to a hearing on habeas
corpus before the SCC. a writ was brought on behalf of Gray, a young
ontario farmer reluctant to leave his farm and enlist when ordered to do
so. the government’s fear of a profusion of legal challenges to the compulsory draft – based on the claim that the cabinet’s reliance on issuing an
order-in-council to change provisions under the military Service act, 1917
was illegal – led to extraordinary steps. the Gray case shows the strength
of the federal government’s determination to establish that cancellation
of exemptions was above any form of legal challenge. Whether the withdrawal of exemptions was constitutional or not, the Supreme Court sided
with the government in upholding the indirect use of the War measures
act and thus closed a potential escape from the draft for Gray and for others whose cases were moving through the courts.
Benjamin isitt writes about courts-martial involving Canadian soldiers
who resisted being sent to Siberia in 1919. reluctance to follow orders to
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embark was shown by some Quebec conscripts when, after the end of the
war in europe, two battalions of Canadian soldiers were ordered to board
ship for Vladivostok to join a British battalion under Canadian command,
known as the Canadian Siberian expeditionary Force. the broad goals of
the endeavour were to assist the White russians against the Bolsheviks
and to support the allies’ economic interests in russia, although the immediate rationale was to keep large quantities of russian supplies held
at Vladivostok from falling into German hands, Germany and austria
now being allied with post-revolutionary russia under the 1918 treaty of
Brest-litovsk. isitt’s analysis of military as opposed to civil trials throws
light on their very different purposes and procedures and provides some
understanding of the many thousands of military trials that took place
during the First World War. the tribunals in Vladivostok are especially
informative because records of the Canadian proceedings were retained
and furnish considerable detail compared with the limited information in
most British records of similar military trials held in europe.
reinhold Kramer and tom mitchell’s chapter focuses on the response to
the extraordinary events of the Winnipeg General Strike in 1919, the most
signifcant post-World War i confict between organized labour, which
was seeking to establish collective bargaining, and major employers, who
wanted a return to the largely union-free world of the pre-war era. as the
strike spread, the union reorganized public services formerly provided by
municipal employees, which, in combination with socialist rhetoric from
a number of radical union leaders, provided the basis for some prominent
citizens and public offcials to view these events as a threat to the existing
order. ironically, as Kramer and mitchell show, it was the Citizens’ Committee of 1000, formed to oppose the strike, and in particular its leader,
a.J. andrews, that assumed state powers, arranging for the arrest of strike
leaders, searches for seditious materials, and the conduct of the trial of
r.B. russell, one of the principal strike leaders.
david Frank’s chapter examines the prosecution of J.B. mclachlan, the
leader of the Cape Breton coal miners’ union as part of the last great labour confict of the post-First World War era, the struggle of unionized
coal miners to resist wage cuts and of steelworkers to gain union recognition. after mounted provincial police waded into a crowd of protestors,
injuring many, mclachlan wrote a circular letter to union locals accusing
the nova Scotia government of being responsible for crimes committed by
the police. the letter was published in Halifax and, based on its content,
mclachlan was arrested and tried for seditious libel. Frank not only provides the rich context in which these charges arose but, like Kramer and
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mitchell, offers valuable insights into the ways in which the legal system
was manipulated to produce a guilty verdict.
as discussed earlier in the introduction, the federal government enacted section 98 of the Criminal Code in anticipation of post-war confrontations but did not use the measure until the Great depression of the
1930s. at that time, the government decided to crack down on Canadian
Communists, who played a prominent role in organizing the unemployed
and leading the radical unions affliated with the Workers’ unity league.
dennis molinaro’s chapter provides the background to section 98, emphasizing how it made the exceptional conditions of wartime permanent, and
then analyses the frst prosecution under its terms, the trial of Communist Party leaders in toronto in 1931. His detailed examination of the trial
highlights both the legal complications that had to be overcome to gain
a conviction and how the law was used to make ideology, not action, a
criminal offence. the theme is further developed in molinaro’s discussion
of the trial of arthur evans, a leader of the Wul in British Columbia, for
the radical content of speeches he delivered in 1932.
Communist and left-wing organizations were also active in Quebec,
where they met with a vigorous campaign of repression, as andrée
lévesque shows in her chapter, which covers police activities and trials
from 1919 to 1939. the story in Quebec had its own unique twists where,
in addition to the Communist Party, an indigenous left-wing and anti-clerical organization, L’Université ouvrière, gained popular support and was
also targeted by the police. additionally, the Catholic Church strongly
supported state repression of radicals, whether in montreal, the centre
of these activities, or in the northern town of rouyn-noranda, where the
Wul organized strikes by miners and forestry workers. activists were
tried on several occasions, often charged with political offences. Finally,
lévesque draws our attention to the persistence of state repression in
Quebec after 1935, at a time when it began to relax in the rest of Canada,
owing to the Catholic Church’s ongoing anti-communism and the sympathetic ear of the premier, maurice duplessis, elected in 1936.
leaders of ethnic communities were also the target of government
surveillance and security measures when seen as obstacles to immigrant
conformity and integration. John mclaren’s chapter focuses on continuing post-war discrimination against the Canadian doukhobor community
and the saga of its leader, Peter Petrovich Verigin, who had been welcomed to Canada in 1925 as a moderate new head of the community and
a victim of russian tyranny. Continuing doukhobor non-conformism led
to local and provincial calls for action and increasing rCmP harassment.
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By the early 1930s, ottawa had come to share local concerns and took
steps to arrange Verigin’s deportation. Peter makaroff, Canada’s frst
doukhobor lawyer and later prominent counsel in the defence of the onto-ottawa trekkers in regina, defended Verigin and successfully applied
for habeas corpus, which led to a Supreme Court of Canada reference. the
Verigin affair highlights the point that labour radicals were not the only
targets of arbitrary repressive measures and that political policing and
deportation also took the form of egregious ethnic discrimination.
Section 98 was used for a fnal time to prosecute prominent radicals in
an effort to put an end to the on-to-ottawa trek in 1935, the subject of
Bill Waiser’s chapter. indeed, it was the attempt to arrest trek leaders on
section 98 charges during a rally that triggered the regina riot. as Waiser
shows through analysis of the trial and a subsequent provincial commission of inquiry, the narrative that the police actions were justifed to preserve law and order was embraced by the authorities, leaving no space
for a nuanced understanding of the experiences of the trekkers, who had
suffered both the economic impact of the depression and the inadequate
response of their governments. offcial adherence to this law-and-order
perspective precluded a serious inquiry into the wisdom of the decision
to arrest the leaders during a rally and the police actions that followed,
and left unrecognized the irony of the fact that the section 98 charges were
dropped before the trials began.
the volume, like the previous ones in the series, closes with short archival essays and illustrative primary documents referred to in many of
the chapters. reproduction of legislation such as the War measures act
and section 98 of the Criminal Code, for instance, serves as a useful reference and avoids quotation of lengthy extracts in the chapters themselves.
the archival essays, by Judi Cumming on suggested research strategies to
deal with relevant records at library and archives Canada and by Patricia
mcmahon on experiences accessing records through the current access to
information regime and processes, speak to the challenges faced by our
contributors in working on the 1914–39 period and serve as guides for
further research.
like any edited collection, this one cannot address all the relevant events
and issues during the period, but we trust that the chapters here further
illuminate and connect many of the key ones and will inspire additional
research in the area. the period 1914–39 was one of both total war and revolutionary challenges. Canadian governments contended with large-scale
migration of populations of diverse cultures and production demands on
an unprecedented scale. the young dominion played an increasing role
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on the international stage, becoming an active participant in international
networks of armed confict, security, and intelligence. the related legal
interventions affected enormous numbers in Canada and the associated
narratives, experiences, and issues are recounted in this book. the longterm historical meaning of these events, including in public memory and
in their effect on efforts to protect rights during times of crisis, will be explored further in the next volume as the Canadian State Trials series moves
on to the Second World War, the Cold War, and the october Crisis.
noteS
1 See e.g., tim Cook, Warlords: Borden, Mackenzie King and Canada’s World Wars
(london: allen lane 2012).
2 Wartime elections act, 7–8 Geo. V, c.39. the limited extension of the franchise to women came at the cost of the rights of immigrants – see mcdermott’s chapter in this volume.
3 See Kordan’s chapter in this volume and also his Enemy Aliens, Prisoners of
War: Internment in Canada during the Great War (montreal and Kingston: mcGill-Queen’s university Press 2002). See also James r Carruthers, “the Great
War and Canada’s enemy alien Policy,” Queen’s Law Journal, 4 (1978): 43.
4 robert Craig Brown and ramsay Cook, Canada 1896–1921 (toronto: mcClelland and Stewart 1974), 83–6; Craig Heron, “the Second industrial revolution in Canada, 1890–1930,” in d.r. Hopkin and G.S. Kealey, eds., Class,
Community and the Labour Movement: Wales and Canada 1850–1930 (St John’s:
llaFur/CClH 1989), 48.
5 david Cruikshank and Gregory S. Kealey, “Strikes in Canada, 1891–1950,”
Labour/Le Travail, 20 (1987): 85.
6 Judy Fudge and eric tucker, Labour before the Law (toronto: oxford university Press 2001), 89–103.
7 James naylor, The New Democracy (toronto: university of toronto Press
1991).
8 reinhold Kramer and tom mitchell, When the State Trembled (toronto: university of toronto Press 2010); G.S. Kealey, “1919: the Canadian labour
revolt,” Labour/Le Travail, 13 (1984): 59; C. Heron, ed., The Workers revolt in
Canada, 1917–1925 (toronto: university of toronto 1998).
9 See david Frank’s chapter in this volume. See also donald mcGillvray, “military aid to the Civil Power: the Cape Breton experience in the 1920’s,” Acadiensis, 3, no. 2 (1974): 45.
10 Benjamin isitt, From Victoria to Vladivostock (Vancouver: uBC Press 2010).
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11 Stephen endicott, raising the red Flag: The Workers’ Unity League of Canada,
1930–1936 (toronto: university of toronto Press 2012).
12 See dennis molinaro’s chapter in this volume. Barbara roberts, Whence They
Came: Deportations from Canada, 1900–1935 (ottawa: university of ottawa
Press 1988), ch. 7, notes that most radicals were not deported under s.41 but
rather were found to be undesirable on other grounds.
13 ivan avakumovic, The Communist Party of Canada (toronto: mcClelland and
Stewart 1975), 96–138.
14 Prerogative powers are those powers that reside in the crown or executive
and are not derived from legislation.
15 eric tucker, “Street railway Strikes, Collective Violence, and the Canadian
State, 1886–1914,” Canadian State Trials, Volume 3 [CST3].
16 See the Canadian Criminal Code, 1892, ss.65, 68. the three heads of high
treason derive from the 1351–2 Statute of treasons (25 edw. iii). the treason
provisions in the Code also included a lesser treason offence, derived from
the 1848 u.K. treason Felony act and adopted into Canadian law in 1868.
the lesser treason offence was treated as non-capital, absorbing some of the
previous judicial and temporary legislative extensions (notably treasonous
conspiracies) to defnitions of treason set out in the medieval statute. the
Code provisions also included the offence of lawless aggression, applicable to
those not owing allegiance and therefore not liable for treason, derived from
1838 upper Canada and 1866 Province of Canada legislation. the lawlessaggression offence was unique to Canada. in english law, liability for treason
could be extended to resident non-subjects founds to come under the crown’s
protection (see e.g, Joyce v. DPP [1946] a.C. 347) but such extensions of liability were deemed unsuitable for the problem of non-resident Patriot and
Fenian raiders from the united States – see Greenwood’s “the Prince affair:
‘Gallant Colonbel’ or ‘the Windsor Butcher’?” in CST2. these laws were
consolidated in 1886 (an act respecting treason and other offences against
the Queen’s authority, 1886, 49 Vict. c.146) and adopted into the new Canadian Code with minor changes – see, generally, desmond Brown and Barry
Wright, “Codifcation, Public order, and the Security Provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code,” CST3, at 529–32.
17 on the north-West rebellion treason trials, see the following chapters in
CST3: J.m. Bumsted, “another look at the riel trial for treason”; Bob Beal
and Barry Wright, “Summary and incompetent Justice: legal responses to
the 1885 Crisis”; and Bill Waiser, “the White man Governs: the 1885 indian
trials.” apart from riel, the leading fgures in the 1885 north-West rebellion pleaded guilty to the lesser treason felony offence when threatened with
charges of high treason. the 1951 and 1953 amendments to what became

This content downloaded from 130.63.63.214 on Fri, 25 Nov 2022 01:01:04 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Wright-Tucker-Binnie_4944_001_(Wright-Tucker-Binnie).indd 33

19/09/2015 7:54:49 AM

34

18

19

20

21
22

23

b a r r y w r i g h t, e r i c t u cker, and susan binnie

ss.46–8 (S.C. 1951, c.47, s.3; S.C. 1953–4, c.51) made a more explicit distinction
between high treason and treason, extending the latter to include espionage
and assisting hostile armed forces from nations not at war.
See the chapters by Swainger and Frank in this volume. on developments in
sedition law in the nineteenth century, see Brown and Wright, “Codifcation,”
in CST3, 546, 528–9, and 542–3. the Criminal Code sedition provisions were
infuenced by Fitzjames Stephen’s conservative approach in the 1880 draft
english Code, which ran counter to the liberalizing trend in english common
law, apparent in cases from the mid-nineteeth century, that narrowed the
scope of the offence (culminating in the 1886 case r v. Burns, 16 Cox CC, 355,
which specifed the need for a distinct intent to produce public disturbances,
and the 1909 case r v. Aldred, 22 Cox CC, 1, which required incitement to violence). the modern english common law developments were not absorbed
into the Criminal Code sedition provisions until the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Boucher v. r [1951] 2 dlr 369.
advocacy of political change by lawful means and drawing attention to matters that produce ill-will between classes were once again excluded from the
defnition and the maximum sentence of two years was restored in 1931– see
S.C. 1931, c.11, ss.2, 3; S.C. 1936, c.29, s.1.
ancillary offences against the state in the Canadian Criminal Code included:
assisting those who commit treason after the fact (formerly misprision of
treason and later dropped in the 1953 amendments); acts intended to alarm
Her majesty; intimidating Parliament or a provincial legislature; assisting an
alien enemy to leave Canada; omitting to prevent treason; assisting deserters;
sabotage; inciting mutiny; offences in relation to the Canadian Forces and the
rCmP; sabotage; and military drilling. on the addition of sabotage and espionage offences, see n.51 below.
S.C. 1914, c.2; r.S.C. 1988, c.22
F. murray Greenwood, “the drafting and Passage of the War measures act
in 1914 and 1927: object lessons in the need for Vigilance,” in W. Wesley
Pue and Barry Wright, eds., Canadian Perspectives on Law and Society: Issues in
Legal History (ottawa: Carleton university Press 1988), 291. this important
study warrants extensive reference, which is provided here with the kind
permission of mcGill-Queen’s university Press (the current publisher of the
Carleton library Series) and Beverley Boissery. See also the chapters by Kordan, mcdermott, and mcmahon in this volume; Kordan, Enemy Aliens, Prisoners of War; Carruthers, “the Great War and Canada’s enemy alien Policy”;
and david e. Smith, “emergency Government in Canada,” Canadian Historical
review, 50 (1969): 430.
Greenwood, “drafting and Passage,” 291–2.
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24 the comparative reach of u.K., Canadian, and australian war measures, and
their implications, is further explored in mcdermott’s chapter in this volume. on the united Kingdom, see, e.g., a.W. Brian Simpson, In the Highest
Degree Odious: Detention without Trial in Wartime Britain (oxford: oxford university Press 1994); C.K. allen, Laws and Orders (london: Stevens 1956). as
Greenwood pointed out in “drafting and Passage,” 292, dora was initially
concerned with the delegation of powers related to matters of espionage and
transportation infrastructure, and while emergency powers were expanded to
more general war purposes by amendment, they never achieved the general
global delegation of regulatory powers to the executive found in the Wma.
in both cases there were similar arbitrary uses of this power around internment and suspensions of habeas corpus (upheld by the House of lords in r
v. Halliday [1917] aC 260 and by the Supreme Court of Canada in In re George
Edwin Gray [1918] 57 SCr 150), as well as more trivial interventions (e.g., outlawing dog shows in the united Kingdom and summarily punishing loafers
in Canada).
25 Greenwood, “drafting and Passage,” 292–3.
26 liberal mP William Pugsley expressed the deepest reservations in the House
about the delegated powers, and attempted to draw attention to the implications of registering aliens and suspected aliens and the need to carefully
justify the suspension of habeas corpus. Justice minister doherty emphasized
the urgent need to ratify measures already taken and to provide for a general delegation of authority rather than attempting to anticipate every kind
of regulation, an approach that would only burden parliamentarians with
continuing calls for amendments. the bill was referred to a special committee, no changes were made, and the fnal reading elicited no debate. it passed
quickly through the Senate despite a large liberal majority – see Greenwood,
“drafting and Passage,” 293–4; also, Canada, House of Commons, Journals,
1–18 (18–22 aug. 1914), and Debates, vol. 188, 1–99 (18–22 aug. 1914).
27 Greenwood, “drafting and Passage,” 294–5. Greenwood’s survey included Le
Devoir, Halifax Morning Chronicle, toronto Telegram, Globe and Mail, Winnipeg
Free Press, Vancouver Daily Province, Financial Post, Monetary Times, Industrial
Canada, Canadian Annual review, Canadian Magazine, Canadian Law Times, and
Canadian Law Journal.
28 See mcdermott’s chapter in this volume.
29 In re George Edwin Gray (1918) 57 SCr 150; Fort Frances Pulp and Power Co. v.
Manitoba Free Press Co. [1923] a.C. 695. See editors’ note, appendix C, doc. 2.
30 See Greenwood, “drafting and Passage,” 297–8: Greenwood notes that mPs
expressed difference of opinion during the october 1970 parliamentary debates on whether the act was originally intended as a temporary measure for
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the duration of the war (Stanley Knowles argued that it was), and that Herbert marx did not address this issue in his 1970 and 1972 studies of the War
measures act. the view that the 1914 act was intended for the duration of the
war only is suggested in r. Craig Brown, robert Laird Borden: A Biography, vol.
2 (toronto: macmillan 1980), 7–8; ron Haggart and aubrey e. Golden, rumours of War, 2nd ed. (toronto: lorimer 1979), 92, 143; and edgar Z. Friedenberg, Deference to Authority: The Case of Canada (new York: Sharpe 1980), 92.
the contrary view of potential peacetime application is suggested in Smith,
“emergency Government in Canada,” 430–1; david ricardo Williams, Duff: A
Life in the Law (Vancouver: uBC Press 1984), 93; and thomas r. Berger, Fragile
Freedoms (toronto: Clarke irwin 1981), 216.
Greenwood, “drafting and Passage,” 303.
r.S.C. 1927, c.206.
Greenwood, “drafting and Passage,” 305–6. Greenwood noted that the 1927
revisions prompted no outside commentary, not even in issues of the Canadian Bar review. the amended War measures act also went further than its
contemporary British equivalent, the emergency Powers act, 1920 (10&11
Geo. V, c.55). the u.K. emergency Powers (defence) act, 1939 (2&3 Geo. Vi,
c.62) was more sweeping but ensured that Parliament retained control over
the types of powers delegated to the executive.
See S.r. elliot, Scarlet to Green: A History of Intelligence in the Canadian Army
1903–1963 (ottawa: Canadian intelligence and Security association 1981),
46–7. a total of ninety-two private radio stations was closed by the government.
4&5 Geo. V, c.12; 1&2 Geo. V, c.28. on the Komagata maru affair, see andrew
Parnaby, Gregory S. Kealey, and Kirk niergarth, “‘High-handed, impolite
and empire-breaking actions’: radicalism. anti-imperialism and Political
Policing in Canada, 1860–1914,” CST3, 483, 497–501. See mcdermott’s chapter
in this volume for further examination of the imperial context.
elliot, Scarlet to Green, 50.
there is evidence that German agents continued to operate with impunity in
new York and elsewhere until 1917.
elliot, Scarlet to Green, 50–1.
See chapter by Bohdan Kordan in this volume.
directed by Sir William otter of the militia, formerly Colonel otter, a signifcant fgure in the 1885 rebellion and known for his role in the Battle of CutKnife Hill.
elliot, Scarlet to Green, 49.
this defnition is cited extensively – the frst usage identifed is executive
order 12333 (4 dec. 1981). united States intelligence activities, s.3.4(a). eo
provisions found in 46 Fr 59941, 3 CFr, 1981 Comp., p.1.
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43 See molinaro’s chapter in this volume.
44 the British, for instance, kept close watch on known German agents operating in the united Kingdom prior to the war and arrested several immediately
on the war’s outbreak, but identifed few enemy agents after late 1914.
45 Prosecutions for seditious utterances were relied on regularly in the Prairies
to suppress anti-war expression, often by enemy nationals, as described in
Jonathan Swainger’s chapter in this volume.
46 See elliot, Scarlet to Green, 54–5; and reginald Whitaker, Gregory S. Kealey,
and andrew Parnaby, Secret Service: Political Policing in Canada from the Fenians to Fortress America (toronto: university of toronto Press 2012), 86–9. as
Whitaker, Kealey, and Parnaby put it: “thus by 1922, with the creation of the
Criminal investigation Branch, the Central registry, and the offce of liaison
and intellegence [within the rCmP], the security state had arrived in Canada” (87).
47 See Brown and Wright, “Codifcation,” CST3, 532–4. the statute 53 Vic. c.10
(1889 u.K.) emerged out of rising British government concerns about new
forms and technologies of espionage and about the security of government
information, sparked by a series of successive leaks to the press in 1887 that
embarrassed the government and compromised its intelligence operations.
the admiralty began work on new secrecy laws on the premise that treason prosecutions for some acts of espionage would be strained and attract
adverse publicity and controversy, while actions against disclosure of state
secrets through administrative measures, civil actions, and criminal prosecutions for larceny or even sedition were inadequate. the treasury took over
the project in 1888 and the bill on breach of offcial trust introduced new
espionage and leakage offences, the latter designed to deter the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive offcial information by public servants. See Franks
Committee, report of the Departmental Committee on Section 2 of the Offcial
Secrets Act 1911, no. 5104 (london: HmSo 1972), ch. 4 and app. iii. See also
david Williams, Not in the Public Interest (london: Hutchinson 1965); Jonathan aitken, Offcially Secret (london: Weidenfeld and nicolson 1971); david
Hooper, Offcial Secrets: The Use and Abuse of the Act (london: Secker and Warburg 1987); rosamund m. thomas, Espionage and Secrecy: The Offcial Secrets
Acts 1911–1989 of the United Kingdom (london: routledge 1991).
48 Section 76 of the Code defned government locations and forms of communications and expression. Section 77 created a dual offence, a minor one
punishable by a year’s imprisonment, of “unlawful disclosure,” which involved obtaining or possession, by all persons, of offcial information that, in
the interests of the state, ought not to be communicated; and a more serious
one, punishable by life, of communicating or intending to communicate such
information to a foreign state or agent of that state. Section 78 set out another
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dual offence, “breach of offcial trust,” applicable to those holding offce or
contract with Her majesty or the governments of the united Kingdom or
Canada who lawfully or unlawfully obtain or communicate information contrary to their duty. Communication or attempted communication to a foreign
state was punishable by life imprisonment; other cases were punishable by a
year.
See mcdermott’s chapter in this volume.
See offcial Secrets act, 1911, 1&2 Geo. V, c.28; 1920, 10&11 Geo. V, c.75
(u.K.); S.C. 1939, c.49.
the maximum was increased from seven to fourteen years for offcial Secrets
act offences, a new offence of sabotage was added to the Criminal Code, and,
as noted above, espionage was included as a form of treason (see offcial
Secrets act amendment: S.C. 1950, c.46, s.3; Criminal Code sabotage offence:
S.C. 1951, c.47, s.18 [amended as s.52 in 1953]; espionage as a form of treason:
S.C. 1954–4, c.51). the latter treason offence was punishable by death or life
imprisonment if committed during war, and, in duplication of the offcial
Secrets act, by a maximum of fourteen years if the espionage was committed during peacetime. overlaps and inconsistencies in these provisions in
the Canadian Criminal Code and the offcial Secrets act were identifed by
the mackenzie Committee, report of the royal Commission on Security (ottawa:
Queen’s Printer 1969); examined at length in martin l. Friedland, National
Security: The Legal Dimensions (a study prepared for the mcdonald Commission of inquiry concerning Certain activities of the royal Canadian mounted
Police (ottawa: Queen’s Printer 1979); and revisited in the law reform Commission of Canada’s Working Paper 49 (1986): 26–30. the u.K. offcial Secrets
act was amended in 1986. in Canada the offcial Secrets act has been recently revised and renamed the Security of information act – or anti-terrorism
act: r.S.C. 2001, c.41, pt.2, ss.24–32).
Brown and Cook, Canada 1896–1921, 220. enlistment fell from a peak of 35,000
a month in early 1916 to about 5,000 a month by early 1917.
ibid., 263–4.
military Service act, 1917, 7–8 Geo.V, c.19.
morton, desmond, A Short History of Canada (toronto: mcClelland and Stewart 2001), 187. elizabeth armstrong, The Crisis of Quebec, 1914–1918 (new
York: amS Press 1967), says that 98 per cent of Quebecers eligible for conscription fled appeals. elsewhere across the country, the fgure was about 93
per cent.
Jack Granatstein et al., Nation: Canada since Confederation (toronto: mcGrawHill, ryerson 1990), 206–14.
Brown and Cook, Canada 1896–1921, 309.
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58 these measures are described in detail in Patricia mcmahon’s chapter in this
volume.
59 Gordon Corrigan, Mud, Blood and Poppycock (london: Cassell 2003), 229.
60 twenty-one executed for desertion, two for murder, and two for cowardice.
tim Cook, Shock Troops (toronto: Penguin 2009), 252–4.
61 Some or most of the Canadians listed under the frst fgure may have been
included in the second if sentenced by a British court-martial.
62 as Corrigan points out in Mud, Blood and Poppycock, 215–48, consideration
was given to soldiers considered to be suffering from “shell shock” or “neurasthenia” throughout the First World War. none were executed if military
doctors confrmed such a diagnosis. eleven per cent of allied soldiers given
capital sentences were executed, a total of 346 men. Seventy-fve per cent of
these executions (266) were for the offence of desertion. only three were for
mutiny.
63 Set against about fve million men under allied control in 1918, the fgure
remains relatively low.
64 Chris madsen, Another Kind of Justice: Canadian Military Law from Confederation to Somalia (Vancouver: uBC Press 1999), concludes (at 40–6) that Canada
lacked adequate training in military law for Canadian offcers until the middle period of the war. the fgure does not provide breakdowns of the composition of the courts in terms of the nationality of court offcers.
65 Clemenceau, for example, has been widely reported to have said, “military
music is to music as military justice is to justice,” although his comment was
reported slightly differently in French.
66 S.C. 1904, 4 edw. Vii, c.23.
67 it was not until 1922 that the Canadian Parliament enacted the frst department of national defence act and, under that statute, the federal government developed a full version of what are now the Queen’s regulations and
orders (Qr&o) and the Canadian Forces administrative orders (CFao),
which, among other essential matters, provided for discipline within the
army. there were continuing issues around which countries’ offcers should
sit on courts-martial of non-British soldiers; this was a small part of many
complex organizational issues not resolved until the middle of the war or
later. See madsen, Another Kind of Justice, 43–8.
68 regulations for the volunteer Canadian militia after Confederation (under
the authority of s.92(7) of the Constitution act of 1867), which acted at frst
in conjunction with British regiments stationed in Canada, were published
by the department of militia and defence in 1870 (after passage of the militia
act, 1868). the British, increasingly eager to withdraw from Canada after
1867, were able to do so to a considerable degree when British garrisons were

This content downloaded from 130.63.63.214 on Fri, 25 Nov 2022 01:01:04 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Wright-Tucker-Binnie_4944_001_(Wright-Tucker-Binnie).indd 39

19/09/2015 7:54:49 AM

40

69

70

71
72
73

74

75
76
77

b a r r y w r i g h t, e r i c t u cker, and susan binnie

replaced by small professional Canadian artillery batteries and forces largely
made up of militia. the Boer War of 1899–1902 saw Canadian volunteers
form a Canadian contingent under British command governed in accordance
with the provisions of the British army act. a Canadian navy established in
1910 was nominally independent but subject to imperial control in time of
war, with parliamentary consent.
two South african soldiers and fve new Zealanders were executed. the editors are grateful for the assistance of eric mcGeer on these matters concerning
military justice.
this policy was a direct result of a court-martial of australian troops in South
africa in 1902 when soldiers attached to a British mounted unit were charged
with shooting Boer prisoners. two australians were executed and the incident became well known after its depiction in the movie Breaker Morant. See
also madsen, Another Kind of Justice, 32–5.
S.C. 7–8 Geo. V, c.19.
as reported in Jean-Pierre Gagnon, L’Histoire du royal 22e régiment (Quebec:
les Presses de l’université laval 1986).
research has been diffcult because few records are available in Canadian
archival holdings. the imperial records, i.e., the records created by the British
tribunals, contain limited material. records for all courts-martial conducted
for troops under the British High Command in europe were passed to the
British judge advocate general. amy Shaw, in Crisis of Conscience (Vancouver:
uBC Press 2009), looks at the fles of conscientious objectors and states that
these records were declassifed only relatively recently because the government of the time did not want to publicize cases of dissent or desertion. theresa iacobelli has recently analysed records of court-martials of Canadians in
her thesis and published interesting information in her Death or Deliverance:
Canadian Courts Marital in the Great War (Vancouver: uBC Press 2013).
Kinmel Park held thousands of u.K. and allied soldiers. riots had occurred
elsewhere during the war among Canadian and allied troops and there had
been prior demobilization unrest at Kinmel Park, but this was the most serious incident, resulting in fve deaths. Fifty-one Canadian soldiers were courtmartialled and twenty-seven convicted – see madsen, Another Kind of Justice,
51–2. See also desmond morton, “‘Kicking and Complaining’: demobilization riots in the Canadian expeditionary Force, 1918–19,” Canadian Historical
review, 61 (1980): 334; and www.canadiangreatwarproject.com/writing/
kinmelpark.asp.
Fudge and tucker, Labour before the Law, 91–103.
PC 1832 and PC 2299.
PC 2525 (banning strikes) and PC 680 (extending the idia).
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78 S.C. 1919, c.46 (originally passed as ss.97[a] and 97[b]).
79 S.C. 1910, c.27, s. 41; roberts, Whence They Came, 13–18.
80 the acquisition of citizenship by domicile simply required the individual to
become a permanent resident of Canada. no formal application for citizenship was required. this was available to British subjects. By contrast, the
acquisition of citizenship by naturalization required an application and the
issuance of a certifcate by the government.
81 S.C. 1919, c.25, s.15; S.C. 1919, c.26, s.1; S.C. 1919, c.38, s.7. roberts, Whence
They Came, 21–2. in 1928 the act was amended to restore the 1910 version exempting all Canadian citizens from political deportation. S.C. 1928, c.29.
82 roberts, Whence They Came, 125.
83 Criminal Code, r.S.C. 1927, c.36, ss.87–91.
84 S.C. 1876, c.37.
85 S.C. 1939, c.30, s.11.
86 r.S.C. 1927, c.36, s.238 (vagrancy), and s.290.
87 unemployment and Farm relief act, S.C. 1931, 58; House of Commons, Debates (1 aug. 1931), 4454.
88 Kramer and mitchell, When the State Trembled, 133.
89 lita-rose Betcherman, The Little Band (ottawa: deneau 1982).
90 Fudge and tucker, Labour before the Law, 156–7.
91 J.H. alan, “military aid of the Civilian Power in Canadian industrial disputes 1876–1925,” occasional Papers on Canadian defence Policy and Civilmilitary affairs, 2, no. 5 (1972), royal military College.
92 S.C. 1919, c.60; mcGillvray, “military aid to the Civil Power.”
93 S.C. 1924, c.57.
94 Stephen l. endicott, Bienfait: The Saskatchewan Miners’ Struggle of ’31 (toronto:
university of toronto Press 2002); desmond morton, “aid to the Civilian
Power: the Stratford Strike of 1933,” in i. abella, ed., On Strike (toronto:
James lorimer 1975), 79–91.
95 Whitaker et al., Secret Service, 105.
96 See, generally, ibid., 60–144.
97 J. Petryshyn, ‘“Class Confict and Civil liberties’: the origins and activities
of the Canadian labour defense league, 1925–1940,” Labour/Le Travail, 10
(1982): 59; S.C. 1936, c.29, ss.1, 4.
98 See Kordan, Enemy Aliens, Prisoners of War.
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